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799 Broadway

New York

THE T H U T TO TRE SOVIRT UNION IN MANCHURIA

The Sovie# Chaltet~geto Capisdim

~~

lies in the northeastern corner of China, Betwem it and the United States lies the vast P d c . But dollars have anddated distance and brought Manchuria into the
life d tbe Ammican worker. American capitdim in its rapid
e x p m h abroad has come into conflict with rival capitalist
m,and Manchuria is me of the points where the d c t
b dmpst. Not only fs Manchuria the battleground of r i d
hqeriaM nations; it is alsa a strategic sector in the attack
which the i m p i d s t powers are directing against the soviet
Unioa
Daily the campaign against the Soviet Union gathas m*
m e t l h . Under the guise of safeguardhg religious liberty,
politid dmomxy, the virtue of womanhood & the purity
of the white r m , the capitaht press of the worId d e 3 on
a mtmtless propaganda campign against the Swiet U h ;
mobilize mass sentiment for a holy crusade,
The slogans change. Outworn myths no longer d t d in
whipping up anti-et
sentiment are dismded for new ones.
Tales about "forced" and "convict" l a b are substituted for
s t o r b aboat the nationahation of women. There is a rapid
ttlrnover in the lies which serve as preterts for the anti-Shet
m&n; bat the reason for the lrampign remrrias furadamentally the same, The Soviet Union is a workers' d k b W p

.a
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world, to the bankers and factory owners and their press,
priests rand rabbis. Every day the friction between these two
worlds
Every step in the socialist mconstruckion of
the Soviet Union, every economic program realized, every
factory constructed by Soviet workers is a challenge to the
apitalii world.
Now the Soviet Union is completing the collectivization
of its agriculture. For the tiny farms, owned by individual
peasants, worked by primitive methods, it is substituting
collective farms, owned by groups of peasants and operated
scientifically. That means a huge stride forward in sodalist
consttuction. It means the death of the peasant proprietor
snd the birth of a new type of peasant, a dally conscious
w o r k in a collective enterprise; it means shorter hours
and higher standards of living for the peasant ; it means
the Incorporation of the peasant into the sxidist fabric of
the Soviet Union ; it means scientific farming, increased production and large wheat exports.
The revolution In Russian agridture coupled with the
amazingly rapid development of Soviet industry bas h e d
world utpitdis~~~.
Leslie Urquhart, wd-ltnawa British atpi-

m.

talist, m t I y wrote :

We are an firmly imbued with thc opinion that if the Soviet gwerament s u c c e d with its fiye year program of M W i o t t of
R d industry, this will put into their hands finandat re.sourcm
tbat will destroy or at last do the great& p o s a i harm to our
dvdhffm.

Uxqubart is right. The triumph of socidist construction
in the Soviet Union is a blow to capitafist civilizrrtion. T f r a t
is why the capitalist powers are continually intriguing against
. the Suviet Udon; why they attempt to disnrpt Soviet trade
and industry and keep their propaganda factories in Rumania
d elsewhere working overtime manufacturing anti-Swiet
> I

"amcity" stories.

But these methods have proved insufticient. Antl-Soviet em-

I

and counter-revolutiomq attempts at sabotap within
kept the Swiet Union from d d h g
ahead bddhg its factories, collectivizing its farms, M x y
production, raising standards of living. The first Fiv&Year
Plan is being successfully completed a year abed of time;
and the second Fiveyear Plan will soon be inaugurated.
This is the reason why the capitalist powers me now s u b
stitnting a policy of direct military intervention for a poUv
of boycott and sabotage; why Japanese troop are m c h g
in northern Manchuria towards the Soviet border and Japanese warships steaqing towards the Siberian coast.
Within the capitalist countries there is a steady i n t d c a tion of the form impelling the campsign against the Soviet
Union. Economic crises-an inevitable feature of aipidist
economy--decrea& wages, the growth of unemployment and
the consequent shrinkage of home markets accelerate the
drive for foreign markets and intensify the mmZwJgn for
inkmention in the U.S.S.R. The overthrow of the workers'
and peasants' government of the Soviet Union wodd give the
imperialists a new and enormous field for exploitation.
The imperialists also seek the destruction of the U.S.S.R.
because it is a constant 5
o
m of inspiration and strength to
the workers and poor farm= of their own conntrl:es, who
are beginning to rebel against the capitdiist system and the
&a, unemployment and hunger that go with it. The hperlalists d z e that a blow strack against the Soviet Union
is directed not against the Soviet workers and peasants alm,
but against the staroing and rebellious workers and farmers
throughout the entire world.
Furthermore the imperialists lmk forward to war as an
escape from the present crisis which grips every capitdht
country. High prices, cost-plus contracts and fat profits p w
out of blucd and guts spilled on battlefields.
dismhed a abut
A short time ago,h'berats and
a war against the Soviet Union as a ~ 1 ~ t i o But
n .ewnu
have mwed so rapidly that it is no longer accurate to @

bar-

the U.S.S.R. have not

~

I

of a "war danger." Japanese imperia3ism is carrying on open
warfare in Manchuria and Japanese armies and warships are
*thin striZri distmx of S w i e t soil. On the western frontiers
of the Swiet Union are the armies of Poland, Rumania and
the BaItic states ready to join in an attack on the U.S.S.R. at
a moment's notice ; and behind these ptrppet state stand
France and Britain and the United States.
I m ~ i s Rivalsies
b

I

The joint campaign against the W.S.S.R. does not mean
that the powers are united. The imperialist nation9 are sharply
. divided among themseIves, Hoover and MacDwald may issue
unctuous statements that "war between the United States and
Great Britain is unth5hbIe." But they know better. They
build misers. The London Confereace clearly r d e d the
intensification'of the force driving the United Stam and
G r a t Britain to war. Their struggIe for markets, colonies, raw
materials, and m i l i w superiority is more intaan ever.
The London Conference, far from reducing naval armaments,
i n m a d the fighting strength of the Amdcan, B r i U and
Jap&Ilesenavies.
One of the richest prizes over which the imperialist powera
are struggling is China. And in no part of China have interd o n a 1 rivalria been sharper than in the Manchurian provinces. One imperialist war has already been fought over Manchm*a.Another one may be.
The Struggle for M a m M

Manchurh consists of the three northeastern provinas of
China-Feqtingtien, girin and Heilangkhg. It is for the most
part a vast mduIating plain, whose fertile mi1 is suitable for
the cultivation of wheat, millet, maize, barley and legumes ;
but more important economically are the mountains that
flanb Manchuria on the east and west. Rich in Iumber and
6

1
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con^ valuable deposits of iron aad d,
these moutltains, particularly the East Mountain Highlands, near the
border, have been m e t e d by fore@ powers.
d m Manchuria touch the sea. Here, the
juts far into the Gulf of Pechili*pmvidhg
bdanchurh agricultural produce, iron, coal and
I I lumber. Here are two d e n t ports, Dairen and Port Arthur,
both free from ice all the year round, and therefore of great
sttategic importance. To the east and south of Manchuria
fim Korea, and east of Korea across the J a p Sea is Japan,
the only industrhhd nation in the Orient. To the north of
Manchuria are tbe vast S i k h plains absorbed by the BusSianEmpireinitsmarchtowt~~dstheeas~
The struggle for control of Manchuria began as early as
I
1895.Manchuria was the point where the J a p e Empire- I
attempting to extend its control on the Asiatic mainlandand the Russian Empire met and clashed. J a w , a highly I 1
industrialized nation, relatively overpopulated, poor in raw I 1
materials, leaked eagerly towards the Asiatic mlrinIand as a
market for its manufactured goods and capital exports, as a
s
u
m of raw materials and a convenient outlet for its surp1us
population. Japan needed iron and coal for its factorie. These
it possessed in insacient qtmtitia. Across the sea lay Manchuria, with cod resouroes equal to Japan's (about four bii- '
lion tons) and iron mources ten eimes as large as Japan's.
Nominally Manchuria was a part of the decadent Cbinese -1
empire ; actually it was a rich prize to be seieed by an enter- I
prishg imperialist power.
J a p h t attempted to gain contro1 of Korea directly
across the serr. In the Sino-Japan= War (1894)that followed ,
Japan= expansion in Korea, the Chinese were completely
routed. By the treaty of Shimon&
Clhina was compelled to
dence of Korea and to cede to Japan the
with its rich mines and strategic =ports.
armed the Russian imperialists, who t h d v e s
tain the fjaotung Peninsula in their qust for a

"warm water" outkt on the Asiatic continent, as an eventual
subtitute for W m t o k , icebound more than half the year.
kt that time, too, the tsarist government was planning to
&end the great transSiberian railroad along the banks of
the Amur River to Madivostok. The construction of the railmad aar#rs Manchuria to Vladivostok wodd ahorten the
distance 560 miles, a n y the rdroad through a more pro- ductive country and atend Russian imperialist influence into
Manchuria. These were the considerations tbat prompted Russia, later joined by France and Germany, to warn Japan that
the cession of the Liaotung Peninsula was a menace to the
pace of the Far East and therefore highly inadvisable. Japan
knew bow to take a hint and returned U t u n g , receiving
instead a large indemnity.
Having forced her rival from Manchuria, Russia now proceeded to grab it herself. Russia's first step w s to form the
Russo-China Bank in St. Petersburg. In addition to ordinary
banking operations the bank was authorized to collect duties
and coin money in China and to acquire railway and telegraph c m d o n s . Russia utilized the bank to secure the valuable Chin- Eastern R a h a d concession in 1896. According
to the secret treaty with China which authorized the railroad,
om of the purposes of the road was rctofacilitate the access
of Russian land troops to menaced points IIn case of war with
Japan," As early as 1896, the R w s b imperialists dearly
r a k e d that the struggle for Manchuria was certain to end

in war.
The Chinese Ehstern agreement was so broad that it gave
Russian imperialism control, over the whole of northern Manchuria. Ostensibly the railroad was a private entqrisq,
Actually it was controlled by the Czarist government. The
statutes of the railroad conformed to Russian law, The railmad itself was administered by a Russian manager. Russian
troops moved through the railroad zone witbout interference.
R d a n traders atripped goods to and from Manchuria without
paying tbe full Chinese customs duties. Russian bureaucrats

--and generals dictated Manchurian life and @W. By mbm
quent agreements, R d a pushed her way farther 11811th.
1898 she acquired the right to
the Chinext Easterp
to the tip of the Liaotung Penhula and secured a twenty&
lease over Port Arthur and Dairen. Thus R&
mdbd
her ambithn to extend her railway system from Errropeaa
Russia to iwfree ports an the Pacific.
During the construction of the Chinese Eastern, the raitway
mne was virtually reduced to the status of a Russian d m y ,
Russians ruled the territory. V i e s and towns were laid out
and popdated by Russian immigrants. But it b not enough
to Ioot; one must safeguard one's spoils. In r8gg R d
reached an agreement with Britain. She promised not to aeek
railroad concessions in the Yangtse basin, in return for whkh
Britain promised not to seek railway concessions in Mmchuria, During the Boxer rebellio11, a mult of Cfiinese restlmess under foreign exploitation, Russian troops poured into
Manchuria and slaughtered thousands of Cbinese. Even after
the imperialist powers had crushed the rebellion, Russia continued to maintain .troop in Manchuria. Japan, which was
apprehensively watchtng the R u s h advance to the south
and Russian attempts to gain s foothold in Korea, demanded
the withdrawal of Russian troops, at the same time OfIering
to recogdm Russian "interests" in Manchuria if Russia w d d
r m g n b Japanese "interests" in Korea. When R d refused,
to make a dehite reply, Japan, dfbthe tadt support of her
dl, England, decked war, won a &hive victory and
wrested from Russia the Liaotung lease, Russian r d m y
rights in Swth Mancuria, and valuable d and iton mina
Thus South Manchuria M
e a Japanese "sphere of influace."

In this early struggle for the control of Manchuria, the
United States took no active part. The United States at this
time was intereted In Chlm & M y as a market for esq3crrta
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rather than investment. She was not particdarly concern&
over ?hescramble for Mm&&
railways; but she was worried about the special trade privileges and reduced tariff rates
which other powers had wrested from China. In x8g9, the
Amm*m Semtary of State John Hay, as spokesman for
American manufacturers interegted in exports to China, addressed his "open door" notes to the principal imperialist
powers, asking them to guarantee equal opportunities for trade
in China and to permit the application of Chinese customs
duties within their sphem of iduence. These demands reflected the dominant faterests of the United States in Cbina,
which at the time were manufactwin# and commercial tather
than finandd. Hay was quite near-sighted. He imored tbe
battle for the controI of Chinese railways and left to his
su-n
the job of securing for American bankets as d
I
as industrialists ''equal rights" to exdoit China. For the next
two demdes, the State Department founht furious diplomatic
battles to secure the pridege of participating in the scrambIe
for Chinese loam and railwavs.
One Amerimn authority, C. Walter Young, expressing the
dews of the State Department, writes :
The p l o d from roo5 to rorq exhl'bited in Manchuria the hwitable conflict between the mlicv of the "own doorn and tbe
i#isertron of treaty tIaht~a c h , while l d y valid and enforreable
in themselves, constituted h fact Iimitations on tbe general assertion
of p l i q b c t e r i d as the "open door."

-

Translate these Jegdistic terms into concrete political terms
and one
an accurate picture of the period-i.e.. a long
drawn wt strun~rltbetweem the Euroman oowers,which had
an earIv start in Chim. add the United States. a Iate contender h the irnwdaltt stmale. The United States enundated the noble doctrine of the " o m door" as a means of
edrrtng its way into the battfe for Chinese concwiions.
In roo< E. H.Radman, American raflroad mamate who
wtth his bankers, Kubn, b e b 8r Co., had hdpd hance Japan
ZO

in its war with Russia, attempted to &ain mnth of the Swth
Manchurian raiIroad as part of an ambitious d m e for
establbhhq a round-*world
transportatim system. IIarriman dreamed of eventually r e a d i q an agreement with the
traasSiberian railroad and linking it by means of the South
Manchurian with his transcontinental system by means of a
fleet of steamers on the Pacific and from the Baltic acrosg the
Atlantic, In 1905 he succeeded in reaching a tentative agreemmt with Japanese representativa for joint AmJapanese control of the South Manchurian; but the Japanese
government, afraid to permit the United Stam a fmthdd in
Manchuriaa dropped the plan fIarriman then unsuccessfully
tried to buy the Chinese Eastern from the Caarist gwemmen~
Not at all dimuraged by t h failures,
~
the Harriman interests decided to build a railroad of their own. In October,
rgog, they received permission from the Chinese govmmmt
to build a railroad from Chlnchow, on the coast of South
Manchuria, up to Aigun on the R u s h border. American
bankers, had& by J. P. Morgan & Co. and Kuhn, Loeb & Co.,
were to finance the railroad; a British construction fmn was
to build it.
It was this railroad project that Philander C. =ox, then
Secretary of State, attempted to use as a springhard for one
of the most ambitious schemes in American diplomacy. Speaking for the American bankers, Knox proposed that China
borrow money from the principal powers for the purpose of
buying all the foreign controlled railroads in Manchuria. He
proposed that rep-tatives
of the powers supervise the railroads during the term of the lm. This scheme for taking
the Manchurian railways from R u s h and J a p and placing
them in the h d a of American and British bankers went
under the euphoaious name of uneutralhtim." Fine words,
decided Russia and J a w , are very Iovely; but railroads are
railroads. T h e Czarist government ffatly rejected the Knox
proposals, declaring that "the establishment of internatid
&histration and control of the Manchurian railroads would
I1

..

1

seriously injure Russian in-ts,"
and that the proposed
Chinchciw-Aigun railroad had distinct "strategic and political"
imprtance damaging to the interests of the Chinese Eastern.
The Japanese protest was equally str~ngand when Britain
and France supported their allies, Japan and Russia, the
United States was compelled to drop the Chinchow-Aigun
p r o p d and the Knox scheme. The "neutralization" scheme
was dropped only temporarily. As we shall see later, ('neutralization" remained the keynote of American policy in Man-

churia
Although defeated in their attempts to acquire control of
Manchuria's railroads, American bankers sacceeded in a h u l hmous struggle to participate in a six power loan (consortium) for Chinese currency reform and for the promotion
of industrial enterprises in Manchuria. But this victory was
also short-lived. The American bankers were forced to withdraw from the consortium when President Wilson in a statement issued March, r9r3, withdrew the support of the American government, declaring that the conditions of the Ioan
" s m to us to touch very nearly the administrative in&
pendence of China itself." Wilson's decision was made before
United States imperialism had attained its fulI strength and
aggressiveness. After the World War, when the United States
emerged as a large capitalqrting coutry, Wilson changed
his tlme and inspired the formation of a new consortium
In the meantime, American attempts to penetrate Manchuria alarmed Russia and Japan and forced the two powers,
who a few years earlier had fought a bloody war, into a
virtual alliance. Japan recognized northern Manchuria as a
R d a n sphere of Muenae, in return for which Russia recogn k d South Manchuria ag a Japanese sphere of influence.
The two powers presented a solid front in opposition to the
V
scheme9 and the Knox "neutralization" proposals.
During this period, Japan extended her influence in Man-

zm
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churia and acqukd contrd of a number of important dlmda
together with valuable mining and lumber c o n d o m . In
191J Japan t m k advantage of the preoccupation of the powm
with the. war in Europe to present China with an ultimatum
demanding among other t h g s the tight to purchase land in
South Manchuria, an option on all railway construction and
ham in South Manchuria, and w-year lease of Port Arthur
and D h .China resisted for four months. Then when Japan
threatened war, she granted the Japanese demands in treaties
signed Ma9 2 5 , 19rs.

The Bolshevik Revolution of rp17 marked a new phase

h the international relations of Manchuria. T h e Rumian
workers and peasants overthrew Russian capitalism and with
it tbe imperialist exploitation of colonial peoples. In the place
of imperialist Russia stood the Soviet Union offering to deal
with CbIna and other colonid countries on terms of complete equality.
The imperialist powers left no stone unturned in their
effort to overthrow the workers' and peasants' government,
which challenged the very existence of capitalism. A barrage
of lying propaganda, blockades, subsidized cumter-revolutions and actual military intervention were dl tried in an
&ort to restore capitalism in R d s .
At the same time the imperialist w
e
t
s saw an opportunity to seiae some of the Czarist spoils for which they hungered, By agreements with China in March and Septemk,
19x8,Japan atablished a joint Sho-Japanese bureau to make
uarrangements" for the transportation of troops to Siberia
where the United States, J a p and other allied m e n were
dpmating with the White Guards. While d p r a t i n g agaht
the U.S.S.R., the allied powers were suspiciously watching one
another. The United States, fearing tbat Japn was extend13

$.

b g its fnfluenm in northern Manchuria and Sibria, proposed that an inter-allied commission supervise the Siberian
railways, including the Chinese Eastern. In January, 19x9,
an inter-allied commission was formed consisting of represatativa of each of the powers having troops in Siberia.
Tfiis general agreement provided for two boards, a Technical
B m d and a Military Transportation Board, the former for
the purpose of "administering technical and emnomid' management of the railways, and the latter for coiirdinating military transportation. This system was put into effect in March,
1919. John F. Stevens, an American engineer, was made p r e dent of the Technical B o d .
Simultaneously, -can
attempts to penetrate Manchuria were revealed in the proposals for a new consortium,
revived by Resident Wilson, who in 1913 had opposed American participation because the consortium threatened the "administrative independencey' of China. American-Japme rid r y in the Far East was apparent throughout the course of
the consortium negotiations. Japan at first sought to exclude
South Manchuria from the scope of the consortium; but was
unsu~~:essful.
After Iong negotiations, she had to content herself with muran= from the United States and Britain that
they wouId not countenance any action by the consortium
that was prejudicial to the national defense and economic
welfare of Japan. These assurances were broad and elastic
enough for any interpretation.
The new f o u r - p e r consortium signed in rgao contained
no specid reservations regarding Manchuria and was therefore a diplomatic victory for the United States, which had
st k t won the right to participate in the financing of Manchuria railways. This was not merely a paper victory. Even
though the collsortium in the five years of its dstence floated
no loan affecting Manchuria, those provinces remain a field
for railroad investment. It is a country with a rapidly grow-

ing population aad with ri& natural remrces. At the end
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of the rgth century the population of Manchuria was only
r4,ooo,ooo; by rg27 the population had increased to 24,500,oeo. T h e rich SOU of central Manchuria i s attracting d
1
lions of Chinese immigrants from the crowded provineeer of
Chihli and Shantung. In the growth of Manchuria, railroads
play a vital r8Ie and offer an excellent field for i
n
v
~
T'he United States won its diplomatic victory at the cast
of Japmee suspicion and hatred. American-Japanese rivalry
in the Far East was extremely acute. Both countries l a d e d
large naval construction programs. Those were the days of
the "Yellow Peril," when the jingo press of this countrJr
ydped for war with Japan. Diplomats and admirals f d y
talked about the possibity of war. This situation dminatd in the Washington Conference of x g a r - ~ 9 2 2 .The Japanew+ realking that they could not compete with the United
Stata in naval construction, agreed to evacuate Siberia and
recognize the principIes of tbe "open door" as applying to
Manchuria as well as other parts of China.
On the quetion of the Chinese Eastern the United States
was less su-ul.
The American delegation tried to push
through a p r o p 4 that smacked of the gnox "neutralb
tion" scheme,It called for an international finance committee
wbich should "exercise generd financial control and be enW e d with the trust&~ which was assumed in rgrg lrnd
which cannot be relinquished until general recognition by
the powers of a Russian government." Had this plan been
successfully carried out, the Ghinm Eastern would still be
mder the control of the imperialist powers, since no general
recognition of the Soviet Union has occurred. The Chinese
Megates
at this p r w and compdled the d m ence to adopt a meaningless resolution for the better ''protection of the railroad." At the same time the other powers
adopted a resolution mewing the "right to insist M t e r
upon the repnsibility of China for the performance or mperformance of obligations t m d s foreign stockholders,'
,

IS

bondholders and creditors of the Chin- Eastem" Thus
for the second time the Udted States was unsuccessful in
its attempts to %eutraJh'' tha Chbse Eastern Railway.
In October of the same year, inter-allied supervision of the
Chinese Eastern was brought to a close and the railroad was
administered under an agreement between China and the
white guard director9 of the Russci-Asiatic Ban$ who had
fled to Paris after the revolution. The W g r 6 claimed m e r ship of the railways even though they owned only a very
smaIl portion of the stock of tbe RustAsiatic Bank and
even though the Soviet Government had nationalized 811 of
the Russian banks.

T h S o k t Union a d Chim Make a Treaty
While the imperialists were quarreling over Chinese
spoils, the U.S.S.R. negotiated with China for relations b
tween the two countries on terms of complete equality and
for the revision of all unequal treaties foisted upon China
by the Czarkt government. In tmatie3 signed in May, 1934,
the Soviet Union renounced all special privileges and cond n s in China, surrendered its aaterritorial rights and
gave up all daims to the indemnities wrated from China
after the Boxex rebellion. The two countries also signed an
agreement providing for joint operation of the Chinese Eastem,in which the U.S.S.R. returned to China dl of the privileges wrested by the Czars, including the maintenance of
trmp in the railway area The U.S.S.R. agreed to assume
m b i l i t y for all debts incurred before 1917. Soon after
the agreements were conduded, the new muqamnt introduced the eight-hour day on the railroad and other measures
for the protection of the workers. (The Chin- Eastern is
still the only railroad in China where the eight-hour day
prevails.) Schools and houses were built for workers and
trade unions and coBperative organizations established.
' The powers which clung to their priviIeges regarded the
16
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Soviet Union's policy with respect to mIonid peoples as a
Mow to imperialist exploitation, which is such an essential
part of modern apitalist economy. Even before the h a 1
signature of the M a y treaties, several governments, including
the United States, protested to Cbina claiming that the
treaties violated the Washington Conference resalution holding China responsible for the debts of the Chinese Eastern
Railway. (China, it will be remembered, bad never agreed
to the resolution,)
The United States protest was b a d on ddms that the
United States bad spent about four million dollars an the
Chin- Eastern and Siberian RaiIways under the authority
of the Tnter-Allied Technid Buard. This was a doubtful
claim, to sery the least, since the board hsd spent the money to
further its military expedition against the Soviet Union. In
reply to the Amprotest, China reminded the United
States that matters concerning the Chinese &stern were for
the disposition of the U.S,S.R. and China done.
The relations between the U.S.S.R and China, although
&&illy friendly, were frequently strained after tbe signing
of the treaties. From rgaq to 1927,there were many cases of
treaty violations by the Manchurian war lord, Chang Tso-h.
The Manchurian authorities continued to protect and encourage the organization of military d e t a h e n t s of Russian
Tsarist 6migrh. In 1925, the manager of the Chinese Eastern
Railroad, a Soviet c i h n , was arrmted because he refused ta
transport Cb&s troops without payment.
While the imperialists and the war lords intrigued agsinst
the Soviet Union, workers', -is',
students', and even middle &IS orpnimtions bailed the Soviet Union as the friend of
Chinese nationalism. In xga5, the Central Committee of the
Kuomintang, which at that time was still conducting a g e n h
stmggle for Chinese nationalism, passed a resolution d-g
that the only government with whi& it could co@erate was

the U S S R
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The Kuomktang Betrays the Rmolutiotl

me amicable relations between the Soviet Union and the
Kuomhtang lasted until that organization betrayed the
C h e x revolution and became a counter-revolutionary
medium for imperialist intrigue. In 1926 and early in 1ga7,
the nationalist armies s w q t northwards from their base in
Canton and gained control of tbe Yangtse Valley. More significant than the military victories was the a w a k e of the
millions of w o r k s and peasants t h u @ o u t southern and
central China. Hundreds of labor and peasant unions sprang
into being. Gigantic strikes shut down the mills where men,
women and children had toiled twelve, fourteen and sixteen
houm a day. Chinese as well as foreign owned mills were
c l o d . It was at this point that the Chinese bourgeoisie and
the careerkt generals of the Kuomhtang betrayed the nationalist movement, butchered thousands of workers' and
peasants1 ladem, and set up a reactionary government at
Nanking. Since 192 7, the Chinese war lords, dfdhted and
un&liatsd with the Kuomhtang, have repeatedy violated
their *&tie with the Soviet Union. They have raided Soviet
diplomatic quarters, arrested and murdered Soviet citizens and
lootd Swiet property. In April, 1927, the Chinese authorities,
with the written permission of the foreign diplomatic corps,
raided the Soviet consulate in Peking. The Soviet Government
in a protest note expressed its policy towards C h i n a 4 policy
to which it has since consistently adherd. The Soviet note
said:
Any imperisIist government representatives Lving been submitted
to bib acts of violence, wouId have retaliated with ach of most
atrocious reprisals. Though the Soviet Government msw~lessuffident technical fesouxca to mart to e n f o e its demaai by

declares that it pitively dcaists from such ~~ , The Soviet Government was, is, and
will be guided in its p&ey bg the inteastti of the toiling masas
of the waolt world md among others by the interests of the Chimx
rqxessiw meaarweg, it nev*
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p W e and the working clams of all countries. In reply to the
Pekbg provodw, tbe Soviet Government de&m that it will not
let itself be provoked by anybody and will by all means mintah
peace among Lhe nations. The Saviet Gbvernment d m not doubt
that in its endeavor to maintain peace it will have the concerted
support of the toiling masses of all countries, and among others,
frrst of alI the people of Chinrl and of the U.S.S.R.

I

The M e t G o v m e n t recalIed its chargB d'aaires and
thereafter maintained only consular relations with C h b .
Nevertheless the provocative raids on Soviet diplomatic quarters continued. In December, 19a7, the Kuomintang war lords
raided the Wet consulate in Canton and arrested the consul-general, The strained reIations between the U.S.S.R. and
China continued until in 1929 fiey culminated in the &we
of the Chinese Eastern by the (=hinwand the sulxquent
critical situation marked by the intervention of the powem.

Mr. Sthnson a& the K d b g g Pact
Economically the United States is the most powerful
nation in the world. Its rapid rise to world suprmqy, its
emergence as the money center and chief manufacturing and
exporting nation of the world is n story that has been f r e '
quently told. The United States has been less proficient in the
development of political instruments for expressing its world
hegemony. Many of its policies still trail the umbilical cords
of the nineteenth century which gave tbem birth. Now the
United Stateg is attempting to make up for this ddcienq; it
is revisii old policies ; whipping old doctrines into d o r m i t y
with its r&e as the most powerful imperialist nation in the
world. In opposition to the League of Nations dominated by
British and French imperialism, the United States, under the
guise of promoting world peace, is devebpiag the gellog,
Pact as an instrument for expressing its world hegemony. In
the dispute between the Soviet U n h and China resulting
from the seieure of the Chinese Eastern Whoad by the
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Chin=, the United States intervened in spite of the oppition
of Japan and Germany, with two purposa in view: ( I ) to
revive its old schemes for the 4'neutralization" of the Chinese
Eastern; ( a ) to develop the Kellogg fact as a powerful
weapon against its imperialist rivab.
As regards the second point, the well-informed correspondent
of the Baltimore Sun who reported the London Conference
wrote, Iate in December, 1929,as foUows:
Put briefly, the situation as viewed un&ddly here is that the
United States within the past summet h s set up a KelIo@gPact
madiary for maintaining the peace of the world which h t e n s to
rival the League of Nations.
9% machinery, despite the fact that the M c h scamfully point
out tbat L rests only on public opinion, is a powerful one whea
dominated by h e United Statea Furthermore, Mr. Stimson has indicated that the United States intends to dominate it as long as the
Eooyer Administration remains in office.
Under this machinery, the United States, and the United States
alone, can decide whether it will throw its weight against a nation
embroiIed in a dispute threateaiag the gellogg Pact. To do this, it
doeg not need to take any vote cm the question; it does not wen
need to have the approval of all of the major powers, as illustrated
by the disapproval of Japan and Germany in advance of Secretary
Stimson's action -ding
Manchuria. RdIy, the machine is me
against which not even the United States Senate has raised its voice.
As w e d to tbis, the h g u e of Nations machimy, wbich France
subordinated .
is a mechanism p d y controued by her.

-
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The motives of the United States in intervening in the
Chinese Eastern dispute of 1929 can hardly be regarded aa altruistic. It is even likely that American interests pIayed a part
in the seizure of the railroad. Let us examine the dispute and
the nature of American i n e n t i o n .
On May 27, Chinese police broke into the Soviet consdate
in arbin, searched the premiw, seized part of the cone
spondence of the consulate and arrested 39 Soviet citizens, including a number of officials of the Chinese Eastern. The
Soviet Union sharply protested against the raid and announced
that in the future it wouId not recognize the extraterritorial

so
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status of the Chhw ernand
Whife empressing it8 friendship
Soviet Government w
d the Nanking- r &- b e t t g a b t
ther 'trying the patience of the govemment of tbe U.SSX
powcathe actions and the violation of treatia aad
men&:'
The Chinese war lords dkegardcd the Soviet warning.
Early in July, Chiang Kai-shelr, the Nanking war lord, C b g
W - I b g , virtual ruler of Manchuria, and Yen Shi-sb, a
pawerfal and ambitious military leader who was awaiting an
oppmime moment to strike at Chimg, conferred in Peking
and apparently decided ta & the Chinese Eastwl Tlx
m o t h of the wat lords dirmered. Chiang, it
hoped to
unite the r i d war lords by means of tr common cause against
the Soviet Uaim and to strengthen the Nanking x m e as
q m h m m for China. Chang Hseriln-limg b W e d that the
s e h m would strengthen his position in Manchuria. On Jdy
I0 the c b e s e broke theit treaty pledges and seized the
C h h e Eastem Railroad on the pretext that the Swiet Union
was carrying on Communist propaganda in Man&uria.
Chinese police seized the Soviet trade
dasttoyed the
trade union and ooiiperative organizations on the. chinee
Eastern d repfrrced the Soviet manager and asistant manager of the railroad with Chinese.

It is nat unlikely that American inkrats were C O M
with the seizure of the railroad. On April 4, thm month
before the
confwated the C h h m lhhm, the New
YoxP TiPlrw amouaced that the Nanging gwwrme~thad
consulted American railroad in-b
with regard to the reorganhtion of the d r d ahng " A m d m W." It had
selected J, J: M d d l , formerly vlmpresident d the Erh
M,cbidy &ti@&ed for breaking the Er5e d m y m#'s s t a m of x910, to BurVey the
igwemma ran-

~~
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roads including the Chinese Eastern. The Titlres neglected to
mention that the ''railroad intertsts" consulted by the Nanking
government consisted of W. W. Atterbury, president of the
Pennsylvania W o a d , and L. F. h r e e , president of the
Delaware and Hudson Company and its thirtynine subsidiar h . Atterbury and h r e e are two of the most m i v e railroad magnates in the country. Both are interested in the
development and control of railroads abroad. I t is quite possible that there was no mmection between the Mantell visit
aad the w h r e of the railroad ; on the other hand, the hypothesis that thee events were not unrelated is streagthened
by the traditional interest of American railroad magnates and
diplomats in the Chiaese Eastern as an important "artery
of commm" between Europe and the Far East. From the
days of Hanhm and -ox to those of Atkrbury and Stimson, the United States has consistently sought the "neutralization" of the Chinese Eastern.
Mantell's visit acquire more sig&cance when viewed in
the light of subsquent events. There is ample evidence
that the United States took advantage of the dispute between
the U3.S.R. and Cbina to revive its old proposals for the
uneutdbtion'' of the railroad and when these fell through
did everything possible to hinder a settlement of the conflict.
S i i e t relations reached a critical stage immediately
after the s&ue of the railroad because of the Chinese refusal to =tore the stutw quo and negotiate its dispute with
the Soviet Union. Three days after the Chinese militarists
seized the railrosd, the Soviet Union addressed a sharp note
to China demanding the release of arrested Soviet citizens,
st conference to regulate dl questions m m g the railroad
and tbe "immediate cancellation of all arbitrary orders rb
garding the railroad." The Soviet note demanded a reply
within three days. The Chinee answer was an insolent defense of the seizure of the railroad and an evasion of the
W e t Union's demands for a conference. On July 17 the
Swiet Union recalled its diplomatic and commercial reprea9

mtative in China and suspended rdIway a o m & t i o ~ s
htween the two countries. Duriag this
of diplomatic
notes, detachments of ChiaRse and White Russian troops were
mobilizing on the border.
It was at this stage that the United States ftrst intervened.
On July IS,after preliminary conversations with the powers,
the United States Government reminded China and the Soviet
Union (through France, since the United States still refam
to recognize the U.S.S.R.) that they were signatories of the
Kellogg Pact and expressed the "hope" that the U.S.S.R. and
China would settle their dispute peaceably. Both promised to
remain mindful of their obligations under the Kdogg Pact.
The bash for the action of the United States government
was not quite clear, since the Kellogg Pact had not yet gone
into effect. State Department officials advanced several theories
for the action of the United States. They first intimated that
the interest of the United States in the Manchurlan crisis
was bawd on the Four-Power Treaty signed at the Washingtion Conference under which the United States, Grmt Britain.
France and Japaa agreed to "communicate fully and frankly"
with mpect to matters threatening their insular possessions
fn the Pacific. This explanation was obviously too thin md
was subsquently abandoned. Then it was ammced that in
interventnn, the United States was solely concerned with the
terms of the Kelluge Pact. To the Kellow Pact explanation,
Stanley Hornbeck. Cbief of tbe Far Eastern D i a o n of the
State Department. subsequently added another e x m e for
Amerfcan intervention.
'*Bv reason of the trusteeship assumed and e x e r a with
reg~rdto the Chinese Eastern during years rmo-~oaa!' H m beck declared, "the ~ ~ w e whicb
r s
participated in the Siberian
expedition, among them the United States, have a natural
concern, moraI, at least, l e d to some, with remd to deveIop
ments which affect the Chinese Eastern Railway."
Thii explanation is extremely interesting since the United
States could on this basis daim a nmoraln and pmdbb

"legal" concern ia the t r a n s - S i b h railroad (on Soviet soil),
parts of which were under the beneficent " t r u s W p n of
the powers participating in the Siberian expedition.

Far more important that his communication of July 18
was a secret aide mamoire which S t i m n handed to the
diplomatic representatives of Great Britain, Japn, France,
Germany and Italy just one week later. The contents of the
document were nwer made public, but their nature was revealed in press reports in various capitals, prmmably
natIng from the Japanese and German foreign offices. In its
issue of August 7, the M a o w Pravda printed a despatch
from Vienna declaring that Stimson's a& metwoire had proposed the appointment of a neutral commission to study the
Manchurian dispute, that both Soviet and W i e troops refrain from hostile action and that a body of five Soviet
citizens and five Chinese headed by a neutral chairman
operate the Chinese ]Eastern. Similar reports had appeared
ddays earlier in the Japanese press. The well-informed
correspondent of the Baltimore Sun even charged that this
secret note had contained a veiled suggestion that the powers
assist China in purchasing the railroad. (Although the Sine
Soviet agreements permit China to p u r b the railroad in
1932, they explicitly state that the purchase must be made
with Chinese funds.)
The State Department never denied tbese charm It maintained a discreet silence about the contents of the aide
m d e and even refused to admit that such a document
existed. Horubeck, in a speech about the Manchurian crisis,
referred to the press reports concerning its existence. "I am
not in aay position to make any shtement on that point," he
said. However, he did discuss the general, position of the
United State regarding Manchurian railway politim. The
United States, he said, owns no railways in Msu1churia nor
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does it have any appreciabIe hmtments in Manchurian rail-
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ways. Then he added:
Concerning the Chinese Eastem, it needs ta be remembered tbat
physically,and economically, it is not an independent railway unit;
it is a link in the one and only direct railway route from Eumpe,
scrosg Sibet.la to the Asiatic pbrts of the P&ifie Ocean, Concerning the South Manchwian line, it needs to be remembered that it
in the link bekween the trans-Siberian line and the ports and tdtories of China and Japan. M e lines, therefore, no matter who
built them or who owns them or who a w t e r a them, are not
exclusiveIy of Russian or exclusively of Japanese conThey were
barn in and of international politics, They serve not done the p p h
or purposes of any one country. They are "public carriers" in a
much broader sense than tbat which is usually colln~tdby t h t expression. One war lULs already been fought because of them-a war
very expensive to the two belligerents and to the country upon w b ~
soil it was fought.

-

Hornthen emphasized t4neutralization"as the traditional policy oi the United States in the international scramble for Manchurian railways. He stressed the Hnax propads
of rg09 and the inter-allied supervision of the Chinese Eastern from 1919-1922.
The State Department refuses to discuss
the secret notes of July 2 5 but Hornbeck's speech suggests
the general nature of tbeir contents.
According to the Baltimore Sm,Japan, Britain and Germany rejected the American proposals. Certainly the Japanese press made it clear that Japan resented the Stimson
propods for international action in the Chinese Eastern dispute just as she had resented the b o x proposals of rw.
I

Tke Red Amy SHaks
In the meantime, Chinese and W t e Guard detachments
crossed the Soviet border and raided Russian villages, The
Chinese authorities in Harbin arrested thousands of Soviet
citizens. Soviet notes to Germany cited numerous border
raids by the Chinese and the murder of scores of Soviet citizens. Through Germany, the Soviet Union repeatedly w a n d
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China against further depredations but the Chiaese disre
garded these warnings, and continued their att*
Tben the
Soviet Union retaliated. Red Army detachments repulsed the
Chine forces, crossed the border-and pushed theG way into
Manchuria. The Chinese retreated, looting towns as they
went. Having driven the Chinese far back into Manchuria,
the Red Army detachments began to withdraw.
Apparently the Chinese war lords were more readily persuaded by this show of force than by the series of dipIomatic
protests which preceded it, for on November zr the press
reported that Chang Hseuh-liang, the Manchurian war lord,
was seeking to negotiate a settlement of the railroad dispute.
On December a, as the negotiations were proceeding and
the Soviet troops completing their evacuation from Manchuria, the United States appealed to China and the Soviet
Union to settle the dispute peacefully and pointed to their
promises under the Kellogg Pact.
"The American government feels," the American communication said, "that the respect with which China and Russia
will hereafter be held in the good opinion of the world will
necessarily in great measure depend upon tbe way in which
they carry out these most sacred promises."
Stinwn's gratuitous intervention was puzzling. For several
days before the United States despatched its communication,
it was apparent that the Soviet Union and China were negotiating for peaceful settIement of their dispute. Even State
Department officials acknowledged that a paceful settlement
appeared to be near. State Departdent claim that the United
StaW was not informed of the negotiations are curious in
view of the press reports from various capitals reporting and
commenting on the imminent settlement of the dispute, On
Nwember 27, the Associated Press reported from Moscow
that negotiations were proceeding satisfactorily. ' h o days
later the A.P, correspondent in Paris reported that the United
States, France and other powers bad agreed to intervene but
a6
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had changed their plans -use
"Mmcow and Mukdm
opened direct negotiations!' On the same day, Litvhm, acting Commissar of Foreign Affairs, handed the German ambassador s note replying to the offer of the Nanking government to negotiate the dispute and saying that aince the
governor of Manchuria had a g r d to Soviet terms, Nanking's
belated offers to settle the dispute amimbly were s u p d w t ~ s .
Even reports from Washington, dated November ag, announced that the State Department had received infondon
that Soviet trcap movements were small and that the dtuation was not critical. These and numerous other reports a peared in the press. The State Department was perfectly
aware that the U.S.S.R. and Mukden m e negotiating for
a peaceful settlement. Why then did the State Department
urge the Soviet Union and China to do precisely what they
were doing? One explanation advanced in the Soviet pres is
that the U ~ t e dStates desired to interfere wit& the negotiations. Another explanation is that the United State wished
to take @vantage of the situation to sttengthen the Kelloa
Pact and establish a precedent for American intemntion in
international disputes.
Great Britain arid France associated themseIveS with the
United States and sent notes to the Soviet Union and Cbim
Germany and Japap refused to follow the lead of the United
States ; both indicating that the invocation of the Kellogg
Pact was superfluous in view of the direct negotiations between the U.S.S.R.and China.
In its reply to the Stimson note, the Swiet Union declared that the United States had intervened at a momens
when the U.S.S.R. and the Manchurian government were conducting direct negotiations for a settlement of their dispute
and pointed out that the Xellogg Pact did not authorize any '
single slate or group of states to act as the guardian of the
Pact. The Soviet note declared that the dispute between the
U.S.S.R.and China could only k settled by direct negotia-

=?

tions of the two powers concerned and expressed "amam
ment that the United States, which by its own will h u no
oficial relations with the Soviet Union deems it possible to
apply to it with advice and counsel." Tbe Soviet note was
dated December 3. On the same day--one day after Stimson's
intervention-+ preliminary agreement for the settIement of
the dispute was reached. The Mukden government agreed to
adhere to the 1924 treaties and to dismiss the Chinese &ahman of the board of directors of the Chinese Eastern.
The next day Stirnson in a statement to the press in reply
to the Soviet memorandum had the temerity to suggest that
the negotiations between the U.S.S.R. and Mulrden showed
that the "public opinion of the world is a live factor which
can promptly be mobiized and which has become a factor
of prime importance in the solution of problems and controversies which may arise between nations."
On December zz, China and the U.S.S.R, signed a protocol
providing for the restoration of the status quo with regard
to the administration of the Chinese Eastern.
Kedogg Pact-Weapon

of ImpwMsf Struggle

American intervention in the Manchurian dispute revealed
a new trend in American foreign policy; it revealed the deliberate attempt of the United States to strengthen the Kelh
i
2
3 pact as a weapon in its struggle for worid domination.
The United States is not a member of the League of Nations,

which is wntrolIed by France and Britain. In opposition to
the League, the United States must create an international
political instrument which it can manipulate. The necessity
for such a policy becomes greater as the conflict between the
United States and its imperiaIist rivals grows more acute.
The Kellogg Pact, literally interpreted, Is a m&gIess
document. Ln vague language it t'obliges" its signatories to
renounce war as an "instrument of natioad policy!' As a
"peace pact" it means notbhg except in so far as it pro-
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powers refuse to permit the United
geUogg Pact to suit

its own intermts.

S h n actually

s w t e d to
be taken to streagthen the

pact. James writes:
'

h t fall w h Wssbiagtan invoked the gellogg Pact in tha R w a -

facts. He then e-ted
that provision should be
in the wisdom of this

In attempting to streng&en the KeIIogg Pact aa m instrument against the Soviet Union and rival imprialist powera,
and revive her scheme for the "neutraliaation" of the Qlinm.
Eastern, the United States further antagonized her imperialist rivals. Japan resented Stimson's attempt to intervene in
Manchuria, which she regards as her sphere of iduence.
War A g a h t tL Souiet Union
Japanese-American rivalry has grown steadily sharper since
rprp. By r g3a it reached a critical point. Japan's avowed ambition to dominate the Asiatic mainland and to enforce her
Asiatic "Monroe Doctrine" has profoundly disturbed American imperialism, whose ambitions in the Far East have increased with the deepening of the economic crisis.
That Japan's upposition to Stimson's intervention in rgag
was motivated by fear and hatred for the United States rather
than by Iove for the Soviet Union is dearly demonstrated today when Japan= troops threaten Siberia and Japanese
politicians talk openly about an anti-Soviet war.
It would be a mistake, however, to infer from the Chinese
Eastern incident that Japan=-American rivalry mitigates the
danger of a joint imperialist attack against the Soviet Union.
The United States, Japan, Britain, France and the other imperialist powers are sharply divided in their struggle for loot ;
but united on one point-their hatred for the Soviet Union.
The triumphant progress of Sdalist construction in the Soviet
Union and the deepening crisis of world capitalism drive the
imperialists to seek an immediate solution of their difficulties
in a war against the U.S.S.R.
The first steps towards such a war have already been taken.
Jagan has set up a puppet governmmt in Manchuria, virtually seized control of the Chinese Eastern RaiIway, 0 0 1 1 ~ trated large forces near the Siberian border and moved her
warship &thin striking distance of the Siberian coast.
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H ~ t i o nof ~the United Sates ae, d e d in tlm Cbq&
Eatet.n bddent of rgxg and to keep in mind d &B
time that J a ~ b w i c s i n
r i d r i a did not prevmt jabt
b p e r h l i s t intervention 3n Siberia a decade hefmthat. It b
important far Americart workers to r&
that tlte dmht.hg

8
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~ i n w m l d ~ t i a t s d a y i s t k e m m i t y oa@taw
f

powen for the !burid Union, rather tban their amity for
me~tber;Wthe~diststtreanikdiatheird&re
to &stmy the first ~~' and fm€d
gwemment. (The
United Stam Is tmhy mpplybg Japan with raw cotton, nitWa, 03, steel products d other war m a w with which
the J
~
~
h
@ on- d war~in China
b
~
andtheir~11ti~~)It~~impoxtantforthel
to~thatabha@&the~Onionisablow
against t h e m r k e r s a n d p m x ~ o ftbe entire world.
t h e deveIopmenPs but ts use may means at their command
tbe war @mt the CBinese people and b defeat the
of wortd c a p i i d m to &troy the SoPiet Union and
precipitate a new world war.
to hdt
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